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Abstract 
In the past, industrial control systems were ‘air gapped’ and 
isolated from more conventional networks.   They used 
specialist protocols, such as Modbus, that are very different 
from TCP/IP.   Individual devices used proprietary operating 
systems rather than the more familiar Linux or Windows.   
However, things are changing.   There is a move for greater 
connectivity – for instance so that higher-level enterprise 
management systems can exchange information that helps 
optimise production processes.  At the same time, industrial 
systems have been influenced by concepts from the Internet 
of Things; where the information derived from sensors and 
actuators in domestic and industrial components can be 
addressed through network interfaces.   This paper identifies a 
range of cyber security and safety concerns that arise from 
these developments.  The closing sections introduce potential 
solutions and identify areas for future research. 
1 Introduction 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems 
support a broad range of application processes.  In the past, 
they were localised and isolated from more conventional 
networks.  Instead of TCP/IP, they relied on specialist 
protocols, including Modbus and Profibus, for vendor-neutral 
interfaces with a host of low-level sensors, actuators and 
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs). This situation has 
changed. Protocols, such as Modbus TCP/IP, offer gateways 
onto Industrial Control Systems (ICS).  These interfaces 
enable the remote monitoring of distributed resources without 
duplicating existing network infrastructures. The PROFINET 
standard for industrial Ethernet provides real time extensions 
to TCP/IP that can be accessed through Wireless LANs. 
Maintenance costs are reduced, avoiding unnecessary cabling.  
There are also human factors benefits.  Operators can use 
mobile controllers in a flexible manner, close to the point of 
need rather than being tied to a control desk.   From a 
management perspective, enterprise planning and decision 
making tools can be informed by real-time process data 
supporting collaborative situation awareness. 
 
Unfortunately, the cyber security of SCADA networks has 
not kept pace with the potential vulnerabilities that are 
introduced through their integration with conventional COTS 
networking.   Many organisations have yet to adopt the 
International Society of Automation (ISA) cyber-security 
recommendation [1].  In consequence, the SHODAN search 
engine reveals thousands of vulnerable, misconfigured, 
control systems that can be accessed over TCP/IP.   These 
vulnerabilities have numerous root causes, many of which do 
not stem from technical limitations. SCADA networks have 
been out-sourced to companies with limited experience in 
security- or safety-critical engineering. Tenders focus on cost 
reduction rather than on a risk based approach to supply-chain 
management.    
 
2. The Internet of Things 
 
These changes in the connectivity of industrial control 
systems have coincided with the development of the Internet 
of Things (IoT).  This refers to physical objects – including 
buildings, vehicles and infrastructure components that are 
embedded with sensor/actuators and with processing 
capability, which can be addressed through network 
interfaces.  There are strong differences between this vision 
and the more centralised focus of traditional ICS/SCADA 
networks, which by default can only be addressed within 
closed local area networks.   
 
Previous paragraphs have described the erosion of such 
differences.   This integration of SCADA and concepts from 
the IoT builds on earlier initiatives.   For example, traditional 
Data Acquisition (DAQ) techniques sample the data that is 
necessary to optimise production processes.    Most ICS 
applications include data historians to store and retrieve 
information to aid process planning and optimise 
manufacturing.  However, the last decade has seen an opening 
up of what were previously closed networks as well as a 
transformation in the scale of integration and data exchange.   
For instance, SmartGrid technologies use the integration of 
digital networks to balance the decentralised generation and 
consumption of power.   Similarly, ‘just in time’ 
manufacturing in next generation factories enables new levels 
of integration between supply and demand.  The ‘digital 
oilfield’ enables operators to control massively distributed 
resources from a single, centralised control room. 
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3. Convergence of Protocols 
 
The convergence of ICS and IoT can be traced back to 
common roots in Machine to Machine (M2M) protocols.  
These were developed to exploit real-time DAQ sources and 
directly informed many of the embedded, real-time 
infrastructures that are now being deployed in IoT enabled 
domestic products; including ovens, refrigerators and air 
conditioners.    
 
In spite of these common roots, there are also significant 
differences between these SCADA techniques and the 
emerging IoT architectures.   As mentioned, many ICS 
applications rely on the Modbus serial protocol.  This builds 
on a traditional client/server model.  It was originally 
intended to support M2M communication between 
Programmable Logic Controllers.  In consequence, the 
protocol only supports data types that are recognisable by 
PLCs rather than the arbitrary binary objects that are 
envisaged within IoT architectures.  A further limitation is 
that data objects are not transmitted with any meta-data.  In 
other words, the semantic information needed to understand 
and use an object has to be embedded within each client.   
This limits the extensibility of Modbus networks; there are 
significant overheads associated with the introduction of 
every new node. 
 
Modbus exploits a master/slave model.  In other words, the 
master must explicitly poll each of the field devices.  There is 
no way for a component to raise an asynchronous alert in 
response to exceptional operating conditions.   Iterative 
polling increases the overheads associated with Modbus 
deployments.  These constraints are exacerbated by address 
limitations with only 254 devices permitted on one data link. 
Modbus networks on their own cannot support the global 
connectivity envisaged in the IoT [2].   Partly in consequence, 
a number of alternative approaches have been developed, 
including those based on Message Queuing Transport 
Telemetry (MQTT).  This is a lightweight protocol extension 
to TCP/IP.  It avoids many of the overheads associated with 
Modbus by using a publish-subscribe model.   Nodes must 
register their interest in receiving information from a 
publisher by contacting a broker.   The protocol is also 
designed for low bandwidth networks and devices with 
limited processing capability – requiring a small code 
footprint.   MQTT exploits a message queuing model that 
increases resilience in the face of different network latencies 
– again this is appropriate for IoT applications that must be 
robust to complex and dynamic environments. Amazon [3] 
and the US Department of Homeland Security [4] have 
embedded MQTT within IoT demonstrators.  The DHS 
applications were intended to offer high levels of inherent 
security while enabling first responders to interact with a 
wide array of sensor/actuators. 
 
Intel provide an illustration of the convergence between IoT 
and SCADA concepts through their integration of Modbus 
and MQTT in their IoT Gateways; “using Modbus as a local 
interface to manage devices and MQTT as a global protocol 
to expand the reach of those devices’ data”.  In other words, 
their Linux-based Gateways act as an interface to 
conventional SCADA networks using Modbus.  Data can be 
translated from the control domain by the Gateway into 
MQTT and transmitted across the Internet to distributed IoT 
applications.   The use of TCP/IP within MQTT also helps 
address the scalability concerns that limit the more general 
application of the SCADA protocol.  The combination of 
SCADA and IoT technologies within, for instance the new 
generation of Intel Gateways, provides a foundation for new 
levels of business integration. 
 
 
4. Layers of Integration 
 
It is possible to identify a number of different layers that are, 
typically, used to structure both IoT and SCADA 
applications: 
 
• Business Processes: At the highest-level IoT concepts 
provide SCADA stakeholders with the ability to integrate 
diverse business processes through improved 
collaborative decision-making.  IoT architectures have 
also been influenced by service-oriented architectures 
that support the ad hoc substitution of process 
components [5].  In ICS applications, it is possible to use 
IoT interfaces, based on the MQTT protocol, to substitute 
different Modbus networks if production needs to be 
moved between sites; 
 
• Applications: The integration of industrial systems across 
both local and wide area networks provides application 
level control from remote locations.   It also provides 
decision makers with multiple, real-time visualizations of 
underlying devices and processes that aid reporting and 
analysis.   Not only does this support the optimisation of 
production processes but it also arguably helps 
operational staff to identify and respond to safety related 
concerns in a way that would not be possible if different 
teams relied on the manual integration of multiple data 
sources from individual systems, in particular where 
knock-on effects can propagate across chemical 
processes or energy distribution networks; 
 
• Data Aggregation: The provision of application level 
services, in turn, depends on data aggregation.   The 
processing and transformation of sensor data helps 
identify potential optimisations.   Later sections will 
argue that the data gathered from numerous, distributed 
production processes can also be used to detect potential 
malware.   For now it is sufficient to mention that the 
integration of SCADA into the IoT supports the 
deployment of big data analytics through the near real-
time aggregation of distributed process information [6]. 
 
• Network Connectivity: IoT concepts and SCADA 
systems both depend on the deployment of network 
protocols that enable the real-time exchange of data 
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across process components.   The design of these 
protocols has a profound impact on the scalability of the 
final architectures.   The more information that a 
recipient needs to know about the sender of data then the 
harder it will be to substitute components or introduce 
novel services/devices.  As we have seen, the 
development of ICS IoT gateways helps address the 
scalability problems associated with traditional SCADA 
protocols.  However, they also raise a host of security 
concerns when the ‘air gap’ has been used to isolate 
industrial systems from wider Internet based applications. 
 
• Physical Devices – there are similarities between 
domestic devices in the IoT and the industrial 
components of SCADA systems.   Both make use of 
embedded processors.  Both have significant real-time 
properties.  However, there are also important differences 
– especially in terms of the kinetic forces and safety 
concerns that arise from potential errors or from the 
consequences of malware.   
 
The following sections build on this analysis by considering 
the impact that different cyber-threats can have upon the 
safety of these different layers in the integration of ICS into 
the Internet of Things. 
 
 
5. Case Studies and Threat Scenarios 
 
The convergence of IoT and SCADA technologies can be 
illustrated smart city initiatives – such as the Sino-Singapore 
Guangzhou Knowledge centre taking shape in Tianjin, China.  
Municipal authorities are working with the suppliers of 
traditional ICS applications to integrate many different 
infrastructures [7].  These include traffic management 
systems; CCTV networks; weather forecasting but also power 
generation and management, water and heating 
infrastructures, revenue generation etc.   The specific aims of 
these Smart City initiatives vary around the globe [8].   
However, this integration of industrial and domestic data 
sources can improve air quality, reduce noise pollution and 
improve public safety.  It can also improve resilience to the 
loss of infrastructure components by detecting and responding 
to faulty components or degraded modes of operation.  
Consumer data ensures ‘just in time’ production throughout 
optimised supply chains.  Centralised control rooms provide 
stakeholders with increased levels of situation awareness that, 
in turn, supports cooperative decision-making. 
 
The integration of SCADA systems within IoT and Smart 
City offers considerable benefits in terms of cyber security. 
Organisations must meet minimum standards of maturity 
before they can access common network and service 
infrastructures. The development of common gateways 
between the SCADA components and conventional IT 
networks can help to ensure consistent approaches to security 
– simplifying the problems of patch management and of cyber 
situation awareness.  Ad hoc solutions to the exchange of 
digital data between different groups of stakeholders can lead 
to inconsistency and confusion about the degree of security 
offered at each interface. 
 
The greater connectivity of service-oriented architectures in 
Smart City implementations also raises significant concerns. 
Most SCADA devices were designed and deployed in an era 
before cyber security was an explicit concern in system 
procurement.  ‘Air gaps’ provided a degree of protection 
through isolation.  Components were connected over 
analogue, serial circuits.  The lack of external interfaces 
meant that attackers required physical access to the 
communications cables so that they could inject or exfiltrate 
serial data.  However, the rise of IP-based communication in 
SCADA environments with external interfaces, for example 
through MQTT, means that there is no need to obtain direct 
physical access to an industrial control system.  The 
integration of SCADA and IOT technologies has created and 
extended their mutual attack surface.  
 
There are further concerns about individual privacy that 
emerge from the inclusion of SCADA applications into Smart 
Cities.   Private companies and state agencies regularly gather 
data from individuals to provide statistical summaries. 
Statistical disclosure control (SDC) is necessary to protect 
individual information that might be extracted from these 
aggregations.  IoT applications with ICS components extend 
the scope of data that might be collected – for example, 
monitoring individual power or water use to identify periods 
of peak capacity.  The inadvertent disclosure of this data 
might enable criminals to target properties that were not being 
occupied.  Location disclosing technologies, including the use 
of surveillance camera, are a standard feature of Smart City 
initiatives to both fight crime and also to optimise 
transportation infrastructures.   However, coupled with facial 
recognition software they arise numerous concerns about civil 
liberties as well as the need to prevent unauthorised 
access/inferences based on the data that IoT techniques might 
gather to support SCADA applications [9]. 
 
Smart Cities illustrate the convergence of SCADA and IoT 
concepts at a macro level. Airport Operations Centres 
(APOCs) illustrate the same trends at a more local level. They 
integrate passenger and cargo operations with the airside 
functions that handle aircraft arrival and departure [10].   The 
aim is to bring together the information needed by diverse 
groups of stakeholders who can work together and support 
collaborative decision-making. For instance, Heathrow 
recently opened a bespoke APOC where airlines, the Air 
Navigation Service Provider (NATS), the UK Border Force, 
the Metropolitan Police and the Highways Agency share the 
same control room.    APOCs can also combine local 
transportation companies, airport retailers, car park 
management etc.   These diverse stakeholders work together 
to optimise the use of aircraft stands, to mitigate the impact of 
weather, reduce noise and environmental impact etc.  As with 
Smart City initiatives, APOCs combine SCADA components 
with enterprise information systems.  Baggage-handling 
applications, heat and lighting systems as well as air 
conditioning plant exploit conventional industrial control 
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systems.   APOCs use the data provided by, for example Air 
Traffic Management applications, to optimise these SCADA 
functions. 
 
As with Smart Cities, Airport Operations Centres raise a 
number of cyber-security concerns.  A companion paper, in 
this volume [10], provides additional details.  Within an 
APOC, it is possible to identify a number of illustrative threat 
scenarios.   For instance, activist groups, campaigning against 
the expansion of an airport, might use a spear-phishing attack 
on junior airport management to obtain data about airport 
operations.   They could use this to maximise the impact of 
direct action – for example launching runway invasions to 
coincide with traffic peaks or staffing shortages. 
 
An alternate scenario involves a sub-contractor inadvertently 
introducing public software libraries into critical control 
systems.  This provides a possible vector for an informed 
adversary to deliver a malicious payload onto IoT or SCADA 
infrastructures.   Neither ICS protocols, such as Modbus, nor 
IoT infrastructures, based on MQTT, provide explicit support 
for the forensic analysis of cyber attacks.  In consequence, 
there are numerous mechanisms that might support cross-
infection.  This would delay the detection, diagnosis and 
recovery from future attacks; undermining confidence in 
these integrated applications. 
 
This integration of IoT and SCADA creates new concerns for 
cyber security and at the same time offers new hope to 
increase the resilience of critical infrastructures.  Both the 
APOC and Smart City case studies support new levels of 
integration within integrated operations centres.  The 
intention is to support collaborative decision-making through 
increased situation awareness.  Most existing initiatives focus 
on the operational improvements and efficiency savings that 
are to be gained through information integration.   However, 
it is clear that this enhanced situation awareness might also be 
supported by the addition of a (cyber) Security Operations 
Centre (SOC).   The integration of multiple SCADA networks 
might help to identify the symptoms of coordinated or 
distributed attacks to multiple sub-systems.  It might also 
provide mechanisms for tracing the root cause of a breach that 
might only be apparent through knock-on effects in other 
systems – for instance the exfiltration of SCADA production 
data through MQTT level interconnects.   The opportunities 
for integrating SOCs into these initiatives has already been 
recognised, for instance within Law no 11/2014, establishing 
the Dubai Centre for E-Security [11].   Similarly, the 
conventional maintenance oriented network monitoring 
applications that have been embedded within existing APOCs 
are being extended to provide explicit support for the creation 
of Airport SOCs.  Proposals have also been made to 
automatically feed data about potential threats to national and 
international SOCs for SCADA threat intelligence [12].  It 
remains to be seen whether such proposals can address the 
organisation and legal barriers that often frustrate initiatives 
to improve mutual cyber situation awareness. 
 
6. Threat Mitigation 
There are strong similarities between the mitigations that can 
be used to protect both IoT and SCADA systems.  For 
instance, the following ‘best’ practices have recently been 
recommended for IoT implementations.   It is readily apparent 
that they might also improve the cyber security of ICS 
applications [13]: 
 
• Best Practice 1: Device Certificates issued to each device 
at the point of manufacturing to establish identity and 
facilitate authentication to service and other devices.  
 
• Best Practice 2: As sensitive data travels through the IoT 
environment, it should be encrypted to prevent 
interception. Likewise, stored data should be 
transparently and seamlessly encrypted to prevent theft.  
 
• Best Practice 3: Code signing of firmware/software 
updates using code signed with digital certificates. 
Additionally, all communication with devices in the field 
should use SSL certificates.  
 
Unfortunately, it is non-trivial to apply these IoT 
recommendations to many existing SCADA networks.  PLCs 
and sensors often lack device certification.  Protocols such as 
Modbus do not provide any default SCADA encryption.  
Although this might be done at the application level, 
processing and bandwidth limitations in many ICS 
implementations mean that this recommendation is seldom 
followed in industrial systems, even when they interface 
through IoT gateways.  
 
The encouragement to apply firmware updates and patches 
poses particular challenges in ICS.  Traditionally, the air gap 
meant that isolated PLCs were seldom updated.  The only 
way that malware might be transmitted was during a firmware 
update via the associated field devices.  There are also more 
practical barriers in physically accessing devices embedded 
within pipelines or installed high on drilling platforms.   
Finally, from a safety perspective the installation of 
successive patches can trigger significant verification and 
validation costs to ensure that any changes do not violate 
previous requirements.   Further concerns stem from the 
problem of ensuring that any firmware originates from a 
trusted source.  Weak authentication schemes create concerns 
when safety-critical ICS devices are integrated into IoT 
architectures.   Hash collisions enable potential attackers to 
make changes to authentic SCADA firmware without it 
necessarily being detected prior to installation on a target 
device. 
 
A number of mitigations reduce the risks when SCADA 
systems are exposed to the IoT.   Ideally, the operational 
domain should be physically isolated from corporate 
information systems.   Securing the gateways between ICS 
and more conventional enterprise information systems can 
reduce the risks of cross-contamination.   There are numerous 
techniques that can be applied – including the use of uni-
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directional data diodes.   Process data can be fed into 
decision-making tools but cyber-threats cannot be transmitted 
from business information systems into the more vulnerable 
SCADA components.   However, this limits the utility of bi-
directional control over massively distributed systems.   What 
is the point in identifying complex optimisations using real-
time data aggregation if the consequence control actions have 
to be manually communicated to each of the underlying 
control systems?  
 
A more flexible approach is to use logical separation.   
Development and maintenance teams ensure that SCADA 
interfaces with IoT/IP traffic is logically separated from 
corporate communications and that attackers cannot exploit 
any potential backdoors.  Logical separation can include the 
use of buffer networks – where SCADA systems are 
prevented from making any direct communication with the 
external Internet.   If physical components of a corporate or 
IoT network – including routers and switches, must support 
the transport layer in an ICS then SCADA communications 
should then be encrypted and routed through VPN tunnels 
[14].  Within any IP-based SCADA interface to IoT 
applications, it is important to disable any unnecessary 
services and then the test that they remain disabled. Role-
based access controls and   authentication can limit the 
privileges of devices and applications to the resources they 
require and the principle of least privilege should contain the 
impact of any potential breaches. Deep packet inspection 
techniques may be required for protocol specific filtering to 
ensure that an attack does not exploit vulnerabilities within 
SCADA networks.   
 
7. Conclusions and Further Work 
Many existing techniques can be applied to improve cyber 
security at the interface between IoT technologies and 
SCADA applications. There are, however, particular 
challenges that remain to be addressed by further work.  For 
example, it is hard to extend conventional intrusion detection 
systems (IDS) within safety-related applications.   Black-list 
techniques search for the signature of known malware, by 
identifying associated filenames or by profiling resource 
utilisation.  This is difficult within ICS applications where 
concerns over confidentiality, IPR and national sovereignty 
limit the exchange of malware signatures.  The US ICS-
Information Sharing and Analysis Centre is one of several 
initiatives that address these concerns.  It is unclear whether 
the information that they provide will ever prove sufficient as 
a primary means of intrusion detection [15].   
 
Alternatives rely on variants of whitelist intrusion detection.  
They enumerate permitted processes within a SCADA 
environment.   Whitelisting works well in many IoT 
applications that do not build on legacy systems – developers 
and integrators can characterise those processes that are 
permitted to run within a system of systems.  In contrast, ICS 
typically rely on components developed over many years.   
Operators seldom have access to source code or possess any 
deep understanding of underlying processes and resource 
structures.   Machine learning algorithms can be used to 
monitor SCADA networks and identify variations from 
expected performance.  However, these techniques cannot be 
used within safety-related applications because it is hard to 
prove that a system will not endanger safety when its 
behaviour changes with the training set.   There are further 
problems with false positives – there are strong financial 
disincentives to halt high-integrity SCADA systems in IoT 
applications given the machine learning techniques often fail 
to distinguish degrade modes of operation from more 
malicious attacks.  Further work is, therefore, required to 
develop hybrid approaches that extend IDS techniques from 
IoT to safety-critical SCADA environments.  At present, most 
implementations rely on IoT level protection to prevent any 
intrusion inside the IDS domain and this remains a high-risk 
strategy as more and more operational systems are integrated 
within Smart City and APOC environments. 
  
 
To summarise, previous generations of industrial control 
systems were isolated from conventional data networks.   
They used specialist protocols, such as Modbus and devices 
used proprietary operating systems.   However, things are 
changing and industrial systems are being influenced by 
concepts from the Internet of Things.  Information derived 
from sensors and actuators in production components can be 
addressed through network interfaces. Technical innovations, 
such as MQTT, provide gateways between IoT applications 
and SCADA systems.  Higher-level enterprise management 
systems can exchange information to optimise and coordinate 
heterogeneous, massively distributed production processes.  
These arguments have been illustrated by case studies drawn 
from the integration of industrial control systems into Smart 
City initiatives and also Airport Operations Centres.  We have 
then identified cyber security concerns that threaten public 
safety.  The closing sections introduce a number of potential 
solutions that provide a measure of confidence in the multiple 
supply chains that intersect when SCADA networks are 
interfaced with IoT applications. 
 
References 
[1]  ISA-TR99.00.01-2004 Security Technologies for 
Manufacturing and Control Systems, ISA-TR99.00.02-
2004 Integrating Electronic Security into the 
Manufacturing and Control Systems Environment, 2004. 
[2] N. Mor, B. Zhang, J. Kolb, D.S. Chan, N. Goyal, N. 
Sun, K. Lutz, E. Allman, J. Wawrzynek, E.A. Lee, J. 
Kubiatowicz, Toward a Global Data Infrastructure. 
IEEE Internet Computing. 2016 May;20(3):54-62.  
[3] Amazon, AWS IoT – Cloud Services for Connected 
Devices. https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/aws-iot-
cloud-services-for-connected-devices/.   Last accessed 
June 2016. 
[4] Department of Homeland Security, S&T’s Internet of 
Things Pilot Demonstrates ‘State of the Practical’. Last 
accessed June 2016. 
6 
https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-
technology/blog/2016/01/25/st-internet-things-pilot-
demonstrates-state-practical.  
[5]  H. Li, D. Seed, B. Flynn, C Mladin and R. Di Girolamo. 
Enabling Semantics in an M2M/IoT Service Delivery 
Platform. 2016 IEEE Tenth International Conference on 
Semantic Computing (ICSC). IEEE, 2016. 
[6] Guo J, Dohler M, Kim WY, Tsoi AC, Zheng K. Mobile 
big data [Guest editorial]. IEEE Network. 2016 
May;30(3):4-5. 
[7] Electric, We Make Smart Cities a reality.  Last accessed 
June 2016. 
http://www2.schneider-
electric.com/documents/solutions/sustainable_solutions/
Smart_Cities_Success_Stories.pdf,  
[8] Y. Li, W. Dai, Z. Ming and M. Qiu, "Privacy protection 
for preventing data over-collection in smart city." IEEE 
Transactions on Computers 65.5 (2016): 1339-1350. 
[9] J. Vaidya and C. Clifton, “Privacy-Preserving Data Min- 
ing: Why, How, and When,” IEEE Security Privacy, vol. 
2, no. 6, Nov.–Dec. 2004, pp. 19–27. 
[10] C.W. Johnson, M. Shreeve, P. Sirko, O. Delain, O. 
Ruhlmann, E. Vautier, B. Graham and M.-T. Meloni, 
Defending European Airports: Cyber-Physical Threat 
Analysis in Total Airport Management. In IET System 
Safety and Cyber Security, Savoy Place, 2016. 
[11] M.P. Efthymiopoulos, 2016. Cyber-security in smart 
cities: the case of Dubai. Journal of Innovation and 
Entrepreneurship, 5(1), p.1. 
[12] G. Cerullo, L. Coppolino, S. D’Antonio, V, Formicola, 
G. Papale and B. Ragucci, 2016. Enabling Convergence 
of Physical and Logical Security Through Intelligent 
Event Correlation. In Intelligent Distributed Computing 
IX (pp. 427-437). Springer International Publishing. 
[13] Gemalto, Securing the Internet of Things.  Last accessed  
June 2016.http://www.safenet-inc.com/data-
protection/securing-internet-of-things-iot/, 
[14] H. Kim, Security and Vulnerability of SCADA Systems 
over IP-Based Wireless Sensor Networks, International 
Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks, 2012, 
doi:10.1155/2012/268478. 
[15] C.W. Johnson, Contrasting Approaches to Incident 
Reporting in the Development of Security and Safety-
Critical Software.  In F. Koorneef and C. van Gulijk 
(eds.), SAFECOMP, Springer Verlag, Heidelberg, 
Germany, 400-409, LNCS 9337, ISBN 978-3-319-
24254-5, 2015. 
  
 
 
 
